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WHO IS THE VICTIM HERE?: VICARIOUS
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AFTER LEIBOVITZ V
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT A UTHORITY
INTRODUCTION
On May 5, 1998, Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of New
York ruled, on an issue of apparent first impression, that an employee
who has never personally been the victim of sexual harassment may
nevertheless sue her' employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 [hereinafter Title VII]2 for failure to prevent a "hostile
work environment." 3 This decision expanded the concept of "hostile
1. Although both men and women can be the victims of sexual harassment, empirical
evidence shows that women are most often the targets of sexual harassment. See ALBA CONTE,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: LAW AND PRACTICE 6 (1990). According to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), in 1994 more than 14,400 women
claimed they were sexually harassed at work, a number that has more than doubled since 1991.
The Diversity Training Group, Sexual Harassment Facts (last modified 1998)
<http://www.diversitydtg.com/articles/shfacts.html>. Complaints filed by men tripled from 481
to nearly 1,500 with ten percent of all such complaints being harassment by female supervisors.
id Thus, for purposes of convenience this article will generally refer to the victim of sexual
harassment with female pronouns and those accused of harassment with male pronouns.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(1994).
3. Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Authority, 4 F. Supp. 2d 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
There are two types of actionable sexual harassment under federal law, "quid pro quo"
harassment and "hostile work environment." "Quid pro quo" harassment involves cases where
an individual is confronted with direct harassment such as: sexual advances, innuendo, or other
unwelcome sexual behavior with the express or implicit message that submission to such acts or
behavior will result in favorable job benefits and refusal will result in tangible job detriment
"Hostile work environment" arises when co-workers or supervisors engage in unwelcome and
inappropriate sexually based behavior which creates an atmosphere of intimidation or hostility.
See Barry S. Roberts & Richard A. Mann, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Primer, 29
AKRON L. REv. 269, 274-75 (1996). These two forms of sexual harassment often occur
simultaneously, such as when the failure to comply with sexual demands of an employer or co-
worker may lead to the creation of a hostile or abusive environment in addition to a "quid pro
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work environment" as a ground for a sexual harassment lawsuit, by
holding that even if the plaintiff was not harassed herself, knowledge
of the harassment of others at her workplace can create a
environment which violates her Title VII rights.4
A "hostile work environment" involves a situation where a co-
worker or supervisor creates an intimidating, hostile or threatening
workplace by engaging in unwelcome or inappropriate sexually
oriented behavior.5 Prior to this ruling, it has been very difficult for a
litigant to persuade a court that they were subject to a "hostile work
environment" in violation of Title VII without showing that they
were personally subject to discriminatory acts.6 The argument
accepted in Leibovitz, vicarious harassment, involves an individual
claiming that they were harmed by discriminatory acts directed at
quo" claim. Thus, as a practical matter, most complaints allege both types of harassment. See
Bonnie B. westman, The Reasonable Woman Standard: Preventing Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace, 18 wM. MITCHELL L. REV. 795, 801 (1992). It is also possible, although much less
common for an employer to be found liable for sexual harassment of or by non-employees.
Kathleen Mulligan & Stacy Thomas, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment of and By Non-
Employees, in NEW FRONTIERS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT LITIOATION 1995, at 61 (PLI Litig. &
Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 533, 1995).
4. Leibovitz, 4 F. Supp. 2d 144. See also Dingeman, Dancer & Christoperson, P.L.C.,
Labor Law Update, Vol. No. 2 (last modified Aug. 1998) <http://www.dingemandancer.com/
laborl.htm>.
5. There is a split in authority in lower courts as to whether an employer must have
knowledge of the actions of employees, which give rise to co-worker harassment. See SUSAN
M. OMILIAN & JEAN P. KAMP, SEXUAL BASED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §§ 11.08,
23.01,23.05 (1990).
Unlike the cases involving harassment by co-workers, the EEOC guidelines impose strict
liability on employers for sexual harassment by supervisory employees. See Sexual Harassment,
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c)-(d) (1991). See also Linda Meric, Rulings Promote Workplace
Fairness, DENVER POST, Sept. 13, 1998, at 02.
See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (holding that "the gravamen of
any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome."'). See also
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522 (M.D. Fla. 1991). See generally
Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under Agency Principles: A Second
Look at Meritor Savings Bank; FSB v. Vinson, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1229 (1991) (discussing the
Meritor case and employer liability for sexual harassment under agency law principles).
See Roberts & Mann, supra note 3, at 276. The initial cases involving sexual harassment
were almost always brought on "quid pro quo" grounds. However, the advent of the "hostile
work environment" has given rise to an increased willingness on the part of the courts to grant
relief for sexual harassment claims, thereby increasing not only the number of claims brought
but also the resultant aggregate liability associated with such claims. Id.
6. Eric D. Randall, Vicarious Harassment: A Nyper Roundup, 1998 No. 5 AFFIRMATIVE
ACTIoN/EEO PERSONNEL UPDATE 17 (1998).
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others.7
Sexual harassment in the workplace is not a recent phenomenon,
although the legal liability associated with this behavior is relatively
new. 8 What used to be simply considered part of the normal
interaction between genders within the workplace is now clearly
actionable. 9 One of the primary reasons that commentators state
consistently explains the continuing pervasiveness of sexual
harassment in the workplace-many men regard certain types of
conduct, including sexual innuendo and sexual demands, differently
than do women.'0
The legislation that Congress enacted to combat sexual
harassment is found primarily in Title VII.1 In an attempt to prevent
7. Vicarious harassment should not be confused with vicarious liability of employers for
sexual harassment committed by their employees or "respondeat superior" which is a well-
settled principle of law. See generally Mark Mclaughlin Hager, Harassment as a Tort: Why
Title VII Hostile Environment Liability Should be Curtailed, 30 CONN. L. REV. 375 (1998)
(discussing issues of employers' vicarious liability for direct sexual harassment).
8. See Roberts & Mann, supra note 3, at 270. See also B. Glenn George, The Back Door:
Legitimizing Sexual Harassment Claims, 73 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1993).
9. In 2980 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines first made employers
liable for harassment committed by their agents and supervisory employees and opened the
possibility for potential employer liability for harassment between co-workers. See Hannah
Katherine Vorweck, The Forgotten Interest Group: Reforming Title VII to Address the
Concerns of Workers While Eliminating Sexual Harassment, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1019, 1019
(1995).
10. Westman, supra note 3, at 795-96.
Men and women respond to sex issues in the workplace to a degree that exceeds
normal differences in other perceptual reactions between them. For example, research
reveals a near flip-flop of attitudes when both men and women were asked what their
response would be to being sexually approached in the workplace. Approximately
two-thirds of the men responded that they would be flattered; only fifteen percent
would feel insulted. For women the proportions are reversed.
Id. at n.93 (citing Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1505 (M.D. Fla.
1991) (testimony of plaintiff's expert witness)). See also Kathryn Abrams, Gender
Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1210
(1989) (arguing that courts have traditionally been more accepting of the male perspective in
judging particular behavior). Perhaps this acceptance is because of the dominance of males in
judicial positions. See, e.g., Joan S. Weiner, Note, Understanding Unwelcomeness in Sexual
Harassment Law: Its History and a Proposal for Reform, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 630
(1997) (noted cases where courts have found such facts as a woman sharing meals with a man,
visiting a man out of the workplace and other "harmless" actions as relevant to whether a
woman has invited subsequent harassment).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). Title VII applies only to employers. Id. Employer is
defined as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
19991
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further sexual harassment, Congress allowed for victims to recover
damages, including punitive damages, under Title VII in 1991.12 To
bring a successful claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must be
"aggrieved" by an unlawful employment practice. 13 This limitation
requiring a plaintiff be "aggrieved" by an unlawful employment
practice is designed to limit those who have standing to sue and to
establish the required substantive elements in the statute.
1 4
Part I of this Recent Development will discuss the history and
evolution of Title VII, focusing on the concepts of "hostile work
environment" and vicarious harassment and how they developed in
Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Authority. 5 Part II will examine
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person ..... Id. The legislative history of
Title VII indicates that the prohibition against sex discrimination was added as a last minute
amendment, which some commentators have argued, was an attempt to defeat passage of the
bill. See Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask For lt?: The "Unwelcome" Requirement in Sexual
Harassment Cases, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1558, 1562 n.26 (1992).
12. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072, codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. 1994). The ability for a plaintiff to recover such monetary
damages, particularly punitive damages, indicates the significant impact that expansion of the
potential plaintiffs under Title VII may have on employers. Vorweck, supra note 9, at 1020.
The notion that employers are the ones best suited to bear the costs of sexual
harassment in the workplace, rather than the victim, is a progressive social statement
that tells employers they must do the right thing and take proactive steps to limit and
remove this problem from the workplace.
Robert D. Lipman & nd David A. Robins, Court's Harassment Rulings Provide Ammunition for
Both Sides, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 1, 1998, at 1, 6. While the amendments were primarily designed to
deter harassment through increased compensation, Congress also recognized the need to protect
the interests of employers charged with harassment under Title VII through the procedural
protections found in the statute. See Vorweck, supra note 9, at 1020.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)(A).
14. See generally Hager, supra note 7. In Title VII, Congress explicitly recognized the
need to protect the interests of employers as well as victims in the procedural rights granted to
employers accused of harassment. Title VII requires the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") to investigate charges of sexual harassment and, if the EEOC finds
reasonable cause, to seek voluntary conciliation with the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). If
there is not reconciliation between the parties, the EEOC or the accuser may then file suit
against the employer. Even once a suit has been filed, Title VII guarantees the accused
employer the right to litigate the charges being made against it in a federal court before
incurring any penalty. Some argue that these procedural protections are an undue burden on the
alleged victim by making them "jump through a series of hoops" in order to obtain relief. See
Nancy Levit, Preemption of Section 1983 by Title VII An Unwarranted Deprivation of
Remedies, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 265, 294-295 (1987).
15. 4 F. Supp. 2d 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
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these developments. This section will question the potential
ramification of the Leibovitz decision, not only the impact upon the
victims of sexual harassment but also upon the employers faced with
the substantial liability associated with Title VII claims.
Part III will argue that the extension of the "hostile work
environment" theory in Leibovitz and other cases is inconsistent with
Congressional intention in drafting Title VII. Additionally, the
extension of such theory imposes an undue burden on employers
while providing little, if any, additional protection to the victims of
sexual harassment and does very little to help eliminate such
harassment.
I. HISTORY
The first Title VII sexual harassment case was decided in 1976.16
However, the concept of sexual harassment and particularly the
notion of "hostile work environment" harassment did not gain wide
spread public attention until Anita Hill accused Supreme Court
Justice nominee, Clarence Thomas, of sexual harassment. 17
Since 1976, the courts have had many opportunities,
unfortunately, to revisit the issue of sexual harassment.18 Although
16. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
17. Barry Willoughby, Discrimination Law: Sexual Harassment After the Thomas
Hearings, 10 DEL. LAW. 18 (1992). Catharine MacKinnon, a practicing attorney and
academician, is also responsible for the increased attention that sexual harassment has received
in recent years. Ms. MacKinnon was involved in trying the case of Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, discussed infra, and has written numerous books and articles on sexual harassment. See
Holly B. Fechner, Note, Toward an Expanded Conception ofLaw Reform: Sexual Harassment
Law and the Reconstruction of Facts, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 475 (1990). In her book,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION, MacKinnon
based her theory of sexual harassment on the inequality of power between the sexes prevalent in
modem society. She criticized the dominant theory of sex discrimination, the differences
theory, which states that when men and women are similarly situated, they should be treated
equally for failing to take account of the lack of power experienced by women. CATHARINE
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION
106-07 (1979).
18. See Vorweck, supra note 9, at 1020-21. Over the years, feminist groups have
spearheaded the campaign to bring issues of sexual harassment to light. However, sexual
harassment should not be considered only a feminist issue. The feminist groups seeking
increased liability for sexual harassment and expanded remedies for victims of sexual
harassment were promoting behavioral norms that differed from existing workplace behavior.
1999]
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the "quid pro quo" cases are relatively clear and easy to evaluate,
courts have struggled with "hostile work environment" claims.1 9 This
confusion results from the fact that it is not entirely clear what
conduct is prohibited by Title VII. 20 The statute does not explicitly
prohibit any and all conduct of a sexual nature in the workplace, but
rather only unwelcome conduct.21 Title VII claims are found in all
levels of employment, in all types of businesses, and among
employees of all social, economic, and educational backgrounds.22
A separate but related issue that has developed in the area of
"hostile work environment" harassment is the question of whether a
plaintiff may recover only for sexual harassment actually aimed at
her or whether sexually based conduct directed at other employees is
sufficient to establish a claim of a "hostile work environment." This
is known as vicarious harassment, and was the theory upon which the
Court ruled in Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Authority.23
Rogers v. EEOC, one of the first cases to address vicarious
harassment, although racial, was decided by the Fifth Circuit in
1971.24 In that case, the court allowed an employee in an
optometrist's office to raise a claim of discrimination based upon her
employer treating patients differently based upon their ethnic
backgrounds.2 5 Similarly, in Vinson v. Taylor, the D.C. Circuit found
that "[e]ven a woman who was never herself the object of harassment
might have a Title VII claim if she were forced to work in an
atmosphere in which such harassment was pervasive. 26
Id.
19. See supra note 3.
20. Hager, supra note 7, at 398-99. "Another problem with a duty so broadly and vaguely
defined is that employers may be sorely stressed as to how to meet it. Into what safe harbor can
they sail? Increasingly, courts tell them that refuge lies only in anti-harassment policies,
programming, notification, and investigation procedures." Id.
21. "Title VII does no proscribe all conduct of a sexual nature in the workplace." Equal
Opportunity Commission, Policy Guideline on Current Issues in Sexual Harassment, EEOC
Notice No. N-915.050 (March 19, 1990), reprinted in 3 EEOC COMP. MAN. NO. 4031 (BNA).
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
22. See Pamela Kruger, See No Evil, WORKING WOMAN, June 1995, at 32-33; Ellyn E.
Spragins, The Cost of Sexual Harassment, INC., May 1, 1992, at 145.
23. 4 F. Supp. 2d 144 (E.D. N.Y. 1998).
24. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F. 2d 434 (5th Cir. 1971).
25. Id.
26. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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However, not all courts agree with this line of reasoning. In
Childress v. City of Richmond, the Fourth Circuit held that white
males may not allege constitutional violations based on a "hostile
work environment" affecting only Black males.27 Similarly, the
Seventh Circuit, in Drake v. Minn. Mining and Mfg. Co., recently
denied the "hostile work environment" claims of non-minorities
claiming that they were harassed due to their association with their
minority co-workers.28 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that because
employment discrimination claims are available to employees of all
races, the key inquiry must be whether the employee has been
discriminated against and whether that discrimination was because of
the employee's race.29
In Kortan v. California, a Caucasian female employee brought a
Title VII action against her employer alleging racial and sexual
harassment and retaliation.30 The District Court ruled that sexually
derogatory remarks allegedly made in the plaintiffs presence about
other female employees were not sufficiently severe and pervasive
that a rational juror could find the plaintiff was subjected to a "hostile
work environment.",31 The court failed to address directly the
question of whether such conduct could ever rise to the requisite level
necessary to create an actionable "hostile work environment."
Nonetheless, it appears from the court's discussion that at some point
such conduct would create a "hostile work environment," however
where that point lies is unclear.
32
27. Childress v. City of Richmond, 134 F.3d 1205 (4th Cir. 1998).
28, Drake v. Minn. Mining and Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 885 (7th Cir. 1998).
29. Id at 884. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
30. Kortan v. California, 5 F. Supp. 2d 843 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
31. Id. The Court found that there was only competent evidence of sexual harassment in
one conversation between the plaintiff and her supervisor and the most severe comments made
regarding other women were "bitch," "regina," "madonna," and "histrionics." Id. at 850-51. See
also Culverhouse v. Cooke Ctr. for Learning and Dev., Inc., 675 N.Y.S.2d 776 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1998) (calling someone a "bitch" is not per se defamation as being called a derogatory name
alone does not injure one in their trade or profession). The fact that courts are unwilling to treat
some types of arguably sexually offensive behavior actionable under sexual harassment or other
law seems to directly contradict expanding Title VII liability to include vicarious harassment.
Id
32. Id. It is interesting to note that the Kortan case decided by an United States District
Court in California only two days after the Leibovitz case was decided by an United States
District Court in New York.
1999]
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The case focused on in this Recent Development is Leibovitz v.
New York City Transit Authority.33 The plaintiff, Diane Leibovitz,
was a deputy superintendent for the Transit Authority.34 In 1993, a
female subordinate complained to Leibovitz accusing a male
superintendent of sexual harassment.35 Leibovitz performed an
investigation of these claims, including interviewing other female
employees, and found that other women had endured similar
experiences within the Transit Authority.36 The plaintiff conceded
that very little of this harassment occurred in her presence and much
of what she knew was second or even third hand information.
37
Leibovitz then contacted her superiors with this information and,
according to her testimony, was told that her complaints could be
detrimental to her career.38 Leibovitz never claimed that she was
directly discriminated against. Instead, she argued that the experience
of the other women and the deliberate indifference displayed by the
Transit Authority caused her severe emotional distress.
39
The Transit Authority contended that Leibovitz was not entitled to
recover under Title VII because she was not a "person... aggrieved"
since she had not been personally harassed and there was no direct
proof that the Transit Authority had been deliberately indifferent to a
violation of her rights.40 Additionally, the Transit Authority
contended that it could not be liable for a "hostile work environment"
because it had followed internal procedures for preventing and
dealing with sexual harassment.4a
33. 4 F. Supp. 2d 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
34. Id. at 146.
35. Id. For a concise description of the facts of the Leibovitz case, see also DeQuendre
Neeley, Sexual Harassment, SECURITY MANAGEMENT, Sept. 1, 1998, at 179.
36. Leibovitz, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 146.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 147. The plaintiff also introduced evidence that showed that there was some
delay in the Transit Authority's internal investigation after the plaintiff's complaints but that
investigation did ultimately occur and the Transit Authority did make internal determinations as
to the merits of the accusations. Id.
39. Federal Cases, LEGAL BRIEFS (Ga. Mun. Ass'n., City Attorney's Sec.) July, 1998.
The plaintiff contended that her emotional distress manifested itself in the form of depression,
sleeplessness, weight gain, and anxiety. See Neeley, supra note 35.
40. Leibovitz, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 147-48, 153-54; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)(1994).
41. Id. at 153; see also NY Court Upholds Award for Employee Who Was Victim of
Vicarious Harassment, ANDREWS SEXUAL HARASSMENT LITIG. REP. June 1998, at 8, 9.
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In denying the Transit Authority's motion to set aside the jury
verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the court held that the plaintiff was an
"aggrieved" person within the protections of Title VII, had a personal
stake in the case sufficient to invoke jurisdiction, and had an injury
that distinct and actual.42 The fact that she was not personally the
subject of the offensive behavior, according to the court, did not take
her claim outside of the protection afforded by Title VII. The court
also ruled that the plaintiff was "aggrieved" with respect to the
substantive element of her claim.43 To confine the concept of "hostile
work environment" to only those who are the direct targets of
harassment would make "quid pro quo" and "hostile work
environment" virtually identical while unnecessarily restricting the
layman's definition of environment. 44 In sum, the court held that
"[p]ersonal harassment is not the gravamen of a hostile work
environment claim."45
II. ANALYSIS
A. Effects of Vicarious Harassment on Litigation and Our Society
Some commentators believe that Leibovitz is likely to end up
being heard by the Supreme Court because of its far reaching
implications.46 This case could potentially expose employers to
significantly increased liability at a time when some are arguing that
42, Leibovitz, 4 F. Supp. 2d 148, 151. "The jury found, in effect, that having to experience
other women being harassed or knowing of the harassment in her own workplace caused
plaintiff to become depressed, anxious, and emotionally distraught, because she felt demeaned
as a member of the harassed class." Id. The jury rejected the plaintiff's claims that she had been
personally harassed and for retaliation. The jury's sole basis for awarding the plaintiff a
$60,000 judgment was its finding that she had been discriminated against because of her
employer's deliberate indifference to the sexual harassment of others in the workplace. Daniel
Wise, Vicarious Harassment Award is Sustained, Hostile Work Environment for Women Cited,
N.Y.L.J. May 6, 1998, at 1, 2.
43. Id. at 150.
44. Id. The author of this article must respectfully disagree with this particular reasoning
on the part of Judge Weinstein. Whether harassment constitutes "quid pro quo" or "hostile work
environment" harassment turns on the conduct of the individual committing the harassing
behavior, not the identity of the victim of the harassment.
45. Id.
46. Neeley, supra note 35 (quoting sexual harassment expert and attorney Jay J. Levit).
1999]
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"hostile work environment" liability should be curtailed.47 Aside
from the numerous individual plaintiffs that this ruling might bring
forward, it also exposes employers to potential class action lawsuits
where only one employee has actually been harassed. Mere
knowledge of the harassment would allow other employees in the
workplace to piggyback onto the claim of a "hostile work
environment.
'A8
Furthermore, although the Leibovitz court did not decide whether
a male employee could sue claiming a "hostile work environment"
stemming from the sexual harassment of female co-workers, the
opinion seems to indicate that such lawsuits would be possible.49 This
is so particularly in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision
recognizing men as a protected class and allowing them to sue under
Title VII in same-sex discrimination suits.5 0 Although the court in
Leibovitz repeatedly mentioned the fact that the plaintiff was a
member of the class being harassed, it never explicitly held such
membership to be a requirement for recovery. t
Even though litigation may serve a valuable purpose in bringing
attention to the very important issues related to sexual harassment
and the public spectacle associated with such litigation arguably
serves as a deterrent to others in similar situations, litigation is not
47. Id. See generally, Hager, supra note 7 (arguing that discrimination law as an anti-
harassment tool is morally and legally confused, doubtful at best in terms of its effectiveness
and troubling in its many unintended consequences). "Broad Title VII harassment liability is
unfair to employers. This is most acutely the case with co-worker harassment. Title VII liability
saddles employers with a duty to protect its workers from the harmful acts of third parties,
namely other workers." Id. at 402.
48. See Neeley, supra note 35. See also Richard Block et al., Can An Employer Be Liable
to An Employee Who Wasn 't Harassed?, BULLETIN (winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts,
New York, N.Y.), July 20, 1998, <http://www.winstim.com/public/bulletinbu19836.html>.
49. Leibovitz, 4 F. Supp. 2d 144, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). "It is not necessary at this time to
address the question of whether a male worker would feel sufficiently disturbed by sexual abuse
of females in his workplace to merit recovery." Id.
50. Onacle v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); see also Richard F.
Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims After Oncale: Defining the Boundaries of
Actionable Conduct, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 677 (February 1998) (discussing same-sex sexual
harassment claims after Onacle).
51. Leibovitz, 4 F. Supp. 2d 151. The judge used the plaintiff's membership in the
harassed class to distinguish Leibovitz from earlier cases such as Childress v. City of Richmond,
134 F.3d 1205 (4th Cir 1998) and Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg., 134 F.3d 878 (7th Cir 1998).
Id.
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without its costs both to the defendants as well as the plaintiffs.52
Furthermore, changes in behavior that are forced by judicial decree as
opposed to common understanding and training voluntarily offered
and advocated by the employer may produce resentment among both
male and female workers. This may not only affect their receptivity
to subsequent workers of the opposite sex but also their interactions
with the opposite sex outside of the workplace.
5 3
In this culture of sensitivity to sexual harassment the Leibovitz
court went so far as to compare the experience of the plaintiff and
other women faced with vicarious sexual harassment to the
experiences of Jews who were granted privileges by the Nazis in
concentration camps in exchange for their silence and keeping their
eyes shut to the horrors around them.54 Although the court did
subsequently concede that the actual harassment at the New York
City Transit Authority is not comparable to the suffering in the Nazi
concentration camps, this is exactly the sort of emotional and
inflammatory attitudes which have been injected into sexual
harassment which are leading the courts away from the true spirit of
Title VII.55 Vicarious harassment only adds to this charged
atmosphere.
B. Vicarious Harassment and Employers
Employers currently face a significant exposure to liability
resulting from Title VII claims in light of the recent Supreme Court
decisions confirming the existence of vicarious liability for Title VII
violations by certain types of employees. 6 The cost to American
52. Abrams, supra note 10, at 1196. "A lawsuit may succeed in calling attention to a
social wrong so entrenched that it has escaped notice. It can be a valuable trump card in cases in
which persuasion fails or the pace of voluntary change is unacceptably slow." Id..
[L]itigation imposes enormous costs, in hostility and in ostracization on the women
involved. Lingering resentments fostered by litigation can penalize women external to
the suit itself. Litigation also can be too crude a tool for achieving the often-subtle
changes in understanding that produce equal treatment or regard for women.
Id,
53. Id. at 1215-16.
54. Leibovit, 4 F. Supp. 2d 152.
55. Id.
56. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
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business of losses resulting from liability in sexual harassment cases
is already enormous, and the additional liability created by expansion
of vicarious sexual harassment claims will serve only to magnify
these costs. S7 Arguably, increased liability will encourage employers
to strengthen their efforts to eliminate sexual harassment through
further implementation of harassment policies and procedures,
increased training and monitoring of employees, and appropriate
remedial measures where necessary.58 Nonetheless, prevention
measures, however desirable, must be balanced against the cost in
damages to the employers and to society as a whole in terms of
increased litigation and clogging of the already overburdened court
systems throughout this country.59
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). In both of these cases, the Court held that an employer is subject to
vicarious liability to an employee/victim for a "hostile work environment" created by a
supervisor with immediate of higher authority over the employee. When no tangible
employment action is taken a defending employer does have the opportunity to raise an
affirmative defense comprising of two elements: (1) that the employer exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior and (2) that the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer to otherwise avoid the resultant harm.
57. Hager, supra note 7, at 402.
Title VII liability saddles employers with a duty to protect their workers from the
harmful acts of third parties, namely other workers. Breach of that duty entails major
liability costs. Defending against alleged breaches also entails substantial costs.
Compliance and prevention - including monitoring, anti-harassment programming,
and detailed complaint investigations - can entail further serious costs and require
focus on distracting matters quite removed from business objectives.
Id. See Ronni Sandoff, Sexual Harassment in the Fortune 500, WORKING WOMAN, Dec. 1988
at 68-73.
58. Hope A. Comisky, "Prompt and Effective Remedial Action?" What Must an
Employer Do to Avoid Liability for "Hostile Work Environment" Sexual Harassment?, 8 LAB.
LAW. 181 (1992).
59. See Abrams, supra note 10, at 1216. Litigation is arguably a less than ideal tool for
producing changes in workplace behavior. Judicial opinions provide only anecdotal notions of
what behavior should be abolished and fail to direct employers as to how to mold their
employees behavior to more acceptable standards. Id. See also Rachel E. Lutner, Note,
Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment: The Morass ofAgency Principles and Respondeat
Superior, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 589, 590 (1993). "In a perfect world, employer liability
standards would provide employers with incentives to prevent future incidents of sexual
harassment and remedy current problems, but not to engage in unproductive or wasteful actions
that inefficiently address workplace sexual harassment." Id. However, some scholars have
argued that if prevention of sexual harassment is the purpose of Title VII then the statute is
unnecessary. E.g., Lloyd R. Cohen, Sexual Harassment and the Law, 28 SOc'VY 8, 13
(suggesting that sexual harassment law is wholly unnecessary because market forces will
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WHO IS THE VICTIM HERE?
The costs associated with the additional liability that employers
will face because of vicarious sexual harassment claims will need to
be recovered. Most likely, these costs will be recouped in the form of
higher costs to consumers for the employer's goods and services or
by reductions in the workforce. 60 Each of these is a loss to society,
which may well outweigh any benefits that result from vicarious
sexual harassment as a cause of action. Any type of remedial plan
will experience diminishing marginal returns at some level and such a
level may have been reached in the use of additional legal liability to
prevent sexual harassment.6' The additional ability of employers to
prevent sexual harassment will not compensate for the costs
associated with such liability thereby resulting in a net loss to society.
Additionally, it is not at all clear that Congress intended Title VII
to reach so broadly when it enacted the legislation. In fact, some
argue that it is a mistake to characterize sexual harassment as gender
efficiently sort out men, women, and jobs so that those who approve of conduct, which would
be classified as sexual harassment, will end up working together so that such behavior will not
be deemed offensive). This author can not help but believe that Cohen's argument is at best
short sighted logic and is confused as to where and what sort of jobs would be created where
sexual harassment is not deemed offensive.
60. Hager, supra note 7, at 398. (discussing a broad interpretation of Title VII liability).
"Plaintiffs' lawyers will see that even very weak suits may be worth money if filed. Efficiency,
coherence, and integrity in the litigation process will erode. The public will pay for all this, as
businesses pass their increased costs along to consumers." Id.
61. This is not to imply that the money currently being spent on sexual harassment
prevention programs is not money well spent. In fact, these programs make good sense not only
from a social policy standpoint but also from a business standpoint.
A 1990 survey was conducted by Working Woman magazine involving 3,300,000
employees at 160 corporations. Data reflected that in a typical Fortune 500 company
with 23,750 employees, sexual harassment costs $6,700,000 per year in absenteeism,
low productivity and employee turnover. This, in turn, represents $282.53 per
employee. Findings did not include the indirect, hard-to-measure expenses of legal
defense, time lost, and tarnished public image.
Diversity Training Group, Sexual Harassment Facts, <http://www.diversitydtg.comlarticles/
shfacts.html>.
A promising alternative to litigation as a tool to combat sexual harassment is voluntary
compliance programs. Many organizations, particularly large corporations, are developing such
programs with some success. Similar programs have been used by corporations in other areas of
the law such as antitrust and regulatory compliance for years. See Brodley, Compliance, in
ANTITRUST ADVISER 505, 517-518 (3d Ed. 1985). Additionally, many full service law firms are
now offering their services to design and implement such compliance programs for their
corporate clients. These programs often avoid many of the pitfalls involved with litigation as a
tool for combating sexual harassment. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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discrimination at all and thus sexual harassment should not be dealt
with under the gambit of Title VII.
62
C. A Step Down the "Slippery Slope" and the Trivalization of Sexual
Harassment
It seems quite possible that this decision could lead to a "slippery
slope" in vicarious liability for all sorts of torts. For instance, if one
sees strangers in a horrible fatal traffic accident caused by the
intentional tort of one of the drivers and suffers emotional distress as
a result, should she be entitled to recover from the tortfeasor for her
emotional distress even though she was in no way involved in the
accident other than as a witness.
63
Perhaps even more important than the "slippery slope" problem is
the potential that vicarious harassment claims will trivialize claims of
harassment by those who were directly harassed. 64 Encouraging
victims of harassment to report that behavior is a significant goal of
Title VII. The increased volume of claims that will be brought under
vicarious sexual harassment theories potentially will desensitize
society to claims of sexual harassment. People may then think of
these claims as trivial and unimportant and thereby actually reduce
the number of victims who chose to report the offensive behavior out
of fear of being ridiculed as part of the "litigation boom" that will
almost surely result from such decisions.
D. Vicarious Harassment and Employees
Yet another potential problem resulting from the recognition of
vicarious sexual harassment is the incentive to induce coworkers to
file Title VII claims even where they do not feel harassed. To date,
the cases have not held that employees must subjectively feel
62. See generally, Hager, supra note 7.
63. Obviously, this may be an extreme example but one can see how the decision in
Leibovitz could lead to such arguments being made about other torts. Further, what if a person
did not hear the information second or third hand as did the plaintiff in Leibovitz, but rather
simply heard rumors through the "company grapevine." Is this sufficient to create a "hostile
work environment."
64. Hager, supra note 7, at 397-98. "Cynicism or indifference towards more dubious
claims overflows onto serious ones." Id. at 397.
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harassed in order to be entitled to file a vicarious "hostile work
environment" claim. Therefore, employees will have an incentive to
feel "harassed" and may also try to convince coworkers that they
have been harassed when, in fact, the coworker has not felt
threatened or harassed.65
Finally, in expanding the potential grounds for claims of sexual
harassment, we must also consider the impact on the employees who
are accused of harassment. 66 While clearly actual harassment should
not go unpunished, not all harassment is intentional or committed
with malice.67 Employers may fire common law at-will employees
for good reasons, bad reasons, or no reason at all.68 Certain Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines provide certain
insulation from liability to employers who take immediate and
appropriate corrective action to known harassment.69 Thus, it is often
easier and less costly for an employer simply to terminate the
employment of those accused with harassment rather than
undertaking time and cost intensive investigations into the charges.
Of course, these discharged employees will almost surely sue their
employer for wrongful termination although their chances of
prevailing in such litigation are small.70  Allegations of sexual
65. This also raises the practical question of how a vicarious harassment plaintiff would
be able to satisfy the "unwelcomeness" requirement is coworkers do not make direct
complaints. Perhaps, what is viewed from the outside as inappropriate behavior is actually
welcome interplay between the direct parties.
66. Unfortunately, as important as the issue of sexual harassment is in modem society
there are instances where false accusations are made for retaliatory or other reasons. For an
admittedly one-sided description of a situation involving dubious charges, see Endeavor Forum
Newsletter on the Intemet No. 86, A Modem Day Tragedy or Saved by a Hurricane (May
1997) (commenting on an article in the Washington Times, K.L. Billingsley, Commentary,
Washington Times, February 6, 1997 at A 15). The author is in no way intending to endorse the
Endeavor Forum or their beliefs but simply to provide varying viewpoints.
67. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Although malice or even intent is not a
required element for Title VII sexual harassment liability, it should be considered before
expanding liability, which could have serious detrimental effects on the accused's reputation,
even if never proved true. Hager, supra note 7, at 398.
68. Vorweck, supra note 9, at 1043.
69. 29 C.F.R § 1604.11(d). Subsequent action will serve to insulate employers from
liability for harassment among coworkers. Subsequent action will have no affect on liability for
harassment committed by employee supervisors or the employer's agents. Id.
70. Kathleen Murray, At work: A Backlash on Harassment Cases, N.Y. TIMES, September
18, 1994 at 3-23 (describing the trend amongst at-will employees unjustly dismissed based on
charges of sexual harassment to bring suit against their accusers and their employers in hopes of
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harassment can result in serious repercussions in the alleged
harasser's personal and professional life.7' The aggregate costs of
these additional lawsuits combined with the costs associated with the
disruption in the workforce also weigh against unnecessarily
expanding liability for sexual harassment.
III. PROPOSAL
The benefits associated with the imposition of vicarious sexual
harassment liability simply do not justify the costs imposed by such
liability. This line of cases must be overturned. Vicarious sexual
harassment exceeds the original scope and purpose of Title VII and
the plaintiffs in vicarious harassment cases are not damaged in the
way that Congress intended for Title VII to compensate.72
At the very least, the impacts of the Leibovitz and similar cases
must be limited to whatever extent possible. For instance, the plaintiff
should be required to be a member of the class being discriminated
against. Additionally, the plaintiff should be required to have
witnessed the offensive behavior or otherwise have concrete proof of
such harassment rather than having obtained information second or
third hand, as was the case in Leibovitz.
CONCLUSION
It is quite understandable and even appreciated that courts and
judges want to do everything possible to eliminate sexual harassment
in the workplace. However, the imposition of vicarious sexual
being able to clear their names). See also In re King Soopers, Inc. and United Food and
Commercial Workers Union, 86 Labor Arb. (BNA) 254,258 (1985) (noting that the charge may
attach a social stigma that could be damaging to the accused's standing in the community);
Ashway v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 59 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 375, 377 n.6 (1989) (noting that a charge
can impair a person's ability to earn a livelihood and can harm his reputation).
71. There have even been several dramatic cases where alleged harassers have committed
suicide out of despair over what they believed to be unfair charges. Vorweck, supra note 9, at
1052 (citing Libby Lewi, Suit Blames Son's Suicide on AT&T, Greensboro News & Record,
July 24, 1994 at Al; Teacher's Suicide Draws Sexual Harassment Concerns, National Public
Radio, Moming Edition (June 15, 1993)).
72. Hager, supra note 7, at 397. "To broaden anti-harassment law is to extend it beyond
egregious misbehavior into zones where wrongfulness is less vivid, and even into controlling
what some would deem matters of taste, not morality [nor legality]." Id.
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harassment liability is not the way to accomplish this goal. The
ability of employers to prevent such harassment is limited. Simply
imposing further liability on the employers will not serve to move
them beyond this limitation. Additionally, the net costs to society
arising from such claims will likely significantly outweigh the net
benefits from such claims.
Thus, Leibovitz must be overturned and Title VII returned to
applying only to direct harassment, conforming to Congress' original
intention in drafting the legislation.
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